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Abstract—Todays smartphones come with a large number
of powerful additional devices such as a low power Bluetooth
sensor, powerful embedded sensors such as the digital compass,
accelerometer, GPS sensors, Wi-Fi capabilities, microphone, hu-
midity sensors, health tracking sensors, and camera. These value-
added sensors revolutionize many sectors of todays community
including tracking, social networking, healthcare, manufacturing,
and monitoring of the environment, etc. These additional embed-
ded sensors could be used for large-scale personal, group, and
community sensing applications. Governments and regulators are
turning to use these features of the smartphone technology to
trace the people thought to have symptoms of certain diseases or
virus e.g. COVID-19. The outbreak of COVID-19 in December
2019, has seen a surge of the mobile applications for tracing,
tracking and isolating the persons showing COVID-19 symptoms
in-order to overcome the contagious disease. As the embedded
sensors could disclose private information of the users thus po-
tentially bring threat to the privacy and security of users. In this
paper, we analyzed a large set of smartphone applications that
have been designed by the governments to deal with the COVID-
19 outbreak and bring the people back to normal life. Specifically,
we analyzed what type of permission these smartphone apps
require, whether these permissions are necessary for the track
and trace, how data from the user devices is transported to the
analytics center, what security measures apps have deployed, and
what privacy threats these features could have.
Keywords—Contact-tracing applications,privacy-preservation,
COVID-19,Security, Pandemic Response
I. INTRODUCTION
It is believed that virus that causes the novel COVID-19
disease spread mainly from having close interaction or contact
with the person already being affected with the virus and still
carrying the attributes of the virus. Since December 2019,
work has already been begun on the development potential
vaccine, however, till the arrival of the vaccine, the only
possible protection solution is to track and isolate the infected
people and trace people who recently in close contact with
them. For this purpose, several countries have turned into the
development of smartphone apps for tracing, tracking, and
informing their citizen about the possible danger when they are
in close contact with the COVID-19 affected person. A large
number of government and non-government contact tracing
apps have been developed for different platforms namely
android, windows, and IOS.
Figure 1 presents the building block and working mecha-
nism of the contact tracing apps [1]. The contact-tracing apps
exchange information when the phones of two persons are
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close enough to each other. These close contacts then will be
informed if the other people who are so closed to him have
been officially infected with the COVID-19. These apps can
only serve as the anchor point to inform citizens and provide
suggestions on whether they should go to isolation or not.
These apps have already shown efficiency in controlling the
spread of the virus in South Korea and Singapore and flatten
the spread curve through effect test and then Trace mechanism
[2], [3].
The developed contact-tracing apps are largely developed
by the national or country lead health regulators. To pro-
vide a reliable and efficient decision, the developed apps
utilize the information from various smartphone sensors (GPS,
Bluetooth) along with names, addresses, gender, age, contact
details, calling log history, and contact history, etc to make
the decision. These apps either interact automatically with
national health systems for the test results of the citizens or
citizens manually provide test results to the health organi-
zation. For instance, upon downloading, Pakistan’s track &
trace app requests permission to use the device’s location
and user personal details such as name, phone number, and
email address and that the data will be shared with a third
party. The current version of this app (as of June-2020) then
uses the device’s location and the location of users with
positive COVID-19 test results to render a map showing high-
level hotspots for COVID-19 infections. Similarly, the app
developed by Google and Apple uses the Bluetooth beacons
to be exchanged information between two persons who are in
close contact with each other. Some countries use the call
detailed records to trace the close contact of the infected
person and isolate them as well.
The use of these apps is normally voluntary and consider as
the support to control the spread of the virus. The developed
app requests for permission of the Private user data e.g.
contact details, call history, web searches, camera permissions,
access to call records, messages, and mobile media (videos
and photos). This information would pose serious privacy and
security risks to the users and limit users to use these apps. The
privacy of users may be protected through the use of different
mechanism e.g. data anonymization, differential privacy, and
decentralized app development of apps [4]. However, it is al-
ready identified that anonymization systems are not providing
effective privacy-preservation [5]–[7] and decentralized app
development is still at the early stage and progressing very
slowly.
In this paper, we provide a first look at the permission and
privacy analysis of the contact tracing apps available at the
Android and IOS app stores. We have studied the app stores
to define the nature of the privacy risks these apps, what types
of permissions these apps required for their functioning, which
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2Fig. 1: Tracing and Isolating through Smartphone based Contact-tracing [1]
permissions are unnecessary, and how they store and process
the user data. Currently, only a small number of certified apps
(developed by the country regulator) are available at the play
stores, so we performed an exhaustive manual analysis on the
available apps. Our analysis shows that the majority of the
track and trace apps collect personal information such as name,
device ID, and location however some apps require access
to further resources such as SMS, microphone, camera, and
storage of the device. Access to such resources is not required
for the accurate function of such apps and therefore should not
be requested by the developers. Furthermore, a number of apps
disclose sharing data with third parties however a minimal
number of these intimate users or require their permissions
before sharing data with third parties. As track and trace apps
are voluntary and rely on the public’s trust to achieve their
function effectively [8], addressing concerns with regards to
data collection and sharing are paramount to their success to
combat COVID-19.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
provides a discussion on privacy and permission analysis of
mobile apps and work performed towards the development of
track and trace apps. Section III defines the background on the
trace and track smart applications. The section also provides
the working mechanism and important features of developed
apps. Section IV critically analyse the security and privacy of
different apps and section V concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A large number of works have been presented that analyses
the functionality of smartphone apps and the leakage of the
sensitive information of their users [9]–[11]. In this section,
we summarize the works related to security and privacy
smartphone apps.
A large number of people are currently downloading and
using contact-tracing apps and hence the privacy in using these
apps has become very important topics for the research and
privacy regulation. The regulators such as the Federal Trade
Commission, the US National Telecommunication and infor-
mation administrations, the European Union Commission [12],
[13], Information Commissioners Office [14] are analyzing
and providing the guidelines to the app developers, content
creators, website operators to improve the development of their
products in terms of security and privacy of their apps.
Smartphone apps normally get access to user data and other
information through the use of permission [15] that the users
provide to the smartphone app at the time of installation. For
example, an app might want the permission of the user to see
the location of the user, the messages stored on the mobile
phone, the search history, etc. The user can still control the
permission after the installation. Providing permission to var-
ious private information would expose the private information
of users to the advertisers, insurance companies [16], [17], and
publicly expose personal data of the users without the users
consent [18], [19]. A large number of smartphones also ask
unnecessary permission that is not required for the functional-
ity of the app, these apps might pose a serious threat to privacy
and security of the users [20], [21]. Muhammad et al. [22], [23]
analyzed the security and privacy of smartphone apps designed
for blocking the advertisement and providing mobile VPN
clients. Ilaria et al. [24] analyzed the permissions requested
by the smartphone apps and assigned a sensitivity score to the
app if the app asked to read the personal information of the
users. They concluded that around 56% of the app asks users to
provide permission to sensitive parts of the users data. Barrera
et al. [25] investigated the relationship between free android
apps and the most popular 1100 Android apps by deploying
machine learning methods. It is also concluded that people
are willing to spend on smartphone apps if apps are asking
for a lesser number of permissions. Enck et al. [26] proposed
a lightweight certification mechanism to identified Android
3apps that are asking for suspicious permissions. Pern et al.
[27] studied the user-consent permission systems by using the
user-centric data from the Facebook apps, chrome browser
extensions, and Android smartphone apps. It is very important
to develop tools or applications that inform users about the
privacy indicator of the apps they are using for specific
purposes. To address this issue, Max et al. [28] developed
a prototype that provides users about privacy indicators of the
app. The prototype also identifies previously exposed hidden
information flows out of the apps.
Contact tracing with smartphones can be employed to
restrict the transmission of a pandemic disease. Utilizing com-
puting technologies to avert and control the pandemic seems
to be an obvious choice. However, these contact tracing apps
might invade privacy, collect personal data, and justify mass
surveillance against users’ wishes. There must be a protocol
for contact tracing that observes commitment to privacy, as
well as provides the consent mechanism where there is a need
to share individual data. Contact tracing may collect personal
data such as location which is not an effective privacy control
when it comes to user’s data [29]. The process of contact
tracing usually involves collecting users’ privacy information
without informing them. Privacy-literate individuals might be
reluctant to share their information which in turn hampers
the process of contact tracing. Privacy-preserving approaches
might encourage individuals to participate more in this process
and increase their confidence in those applications [30].
Prominent privacy researchers from across the world are
arguing with the government agencies and vendors involved
in developing the contact-tracing application about the privacy
and highlighted the catastrophic consequences these apps
would have on the citizens private lives [31], [32]. Berke
et al. [33] utilized the semantics of private set interaction
for assessing the risk exposure of users using encrypted and
anonymous GPS locations. Manish et al. [34] analyzed the
privacy preservation mechanism for various contact tracing
applications and discussed the attributes which contact-tracing
apps should have to ensure the privacy of users. Michael et
al [35] discussed the ethical consideration of contact-tracing
apps for fighting against the COVID-19. Several contact-
tracing application has been compared in [36] in terms of data
collection, retention of data, purpose, and sharing of collected
data, what mechanisms the apps have deployed to ensure the
privacy of users. Most recently, Carmela et al. [4] describes
and analyses a decentralized system for secure and privacy-
preserving proximity tracing to combat the spread of COVID-
19. The system is solely based on the anonymous identifiers
of positive users of the COVID-19 without providing the
exact location information to the health authorities. Health
authorities or any other users would not be able to learn the
private information of the users except a notification message
when a person is exposed to COVID-19 affected person. The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDS) have issued
guidelines that define a set of features a contact tracing apps
should have help health departments to overcome the COVID-
19 pandemic [37].
Many contact tracing applications involve tracing users
using GPS, Bluetooth, and wireless technologies [38]–[43].
These approaches usually provide users with two options.
Either the user has to self-report themselves, or the application
takes the help of a wireless technology [30].
III. CHARACTERIZING CONTACT TRACING APPS
Contact tracing is an important tool for the community
to prevent the outspread of novel pandemic diseases, such
as COVID-19 [44]. In past contact-tracing tools have shown
effectiveness against the spread of transmissible diseases such
as STD, HIV, Ebola, and tuberculosis [45], [46]. Contact
tracing is the process of identifying persons who are in
close contact with the infected person so that exposed targets
can be informed to have self-isolation and quarantine, thus
breaking the chain of transmission [29]. The current outbreak
of COVID-19 and its highly contagious feature motivates
technology developer to develop smartphone apps for the
effective tracing of the footprint of the disease. In this section,
we provide the architectural setup of contact-tracing apps and
their significance towards controlling the spread of disease.
A. Centralized and Decentralized Architecture
The design of contact-tracing apps is mainly using data from
the users thus has some privacy concerns which motivate the
developer to come up with privacy-preserving solutions. The
privacy of users can be addressed using the centralized and
decentralized system setup. The centralized and decentralized
apps entirely have different architecture and properties shown
in Figure 2 and explained below.
1) Centralised models: In the centralized setup, the smart-
phone of the users having specific contact-tracing apps send
the random identifier to the centralized trusted system. The
centralized system in this setup holds the information from all
users of the app. If a person has tested positive for the COVID-
19 virus, the identifier of other users who have exchanged
identifiers in the past can be sent to the centralized server
along with other information e.g. time data is sent, a time when
identifiers are exchanged, etc. The centralized system decrypts
the identifiers and automatically notifies the interacted phones
suggesting or informing users to self-isolate or take other
preventive measures. The centralized system can also utilize
the available information for further analysis and policies for
placing lockdown in hard-hit proximities.
2) Decentralised models: In the decentralized setup there
is not a trusted centralized system that exists for the handling
of the user’s data and matching of smartphones identifier. If a
person is diagnosed positive with the COVID-19, the identifier
of his phone and test result is uploaded to the centralized
system. Other smartphones having the app can access these
reports and locally establish the truth whether he was close to
an infected individual or not. If a smartphone comes across
the identity that has COVID-19 then alert is the sent to the
user of the smartphone for precaution and self-isolation. The
location and proximity of the person are not known to the
centralized system thus ensuring the privacy of the users using
the app. The health organizations or the government still used
the shared data to understand the spread of the virus in the
community but would not have detailed information about the
users.
4Fig. 2: Architectural Setup of Contact Tracing Apps
B. Significance of Contact Tracing for COVID-19
Contact tracing for COVID-19 may help in limiting the
Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in December
2019, as of June 2020, there exists no medicine or vaccine
to fight against the rapidly spreading pandemic. Governments
across the world are currently focusing on the ways that would
have the least load on their health systems. This has been
achieved through imposing travel restrictions or lockdown
restrictions on the people however, it not only effecting the
economy but also fears the second wave of infection once the
lockdown restrictions are relaxed. The governments are finding
ways to identify the methods for contact tracing to quickly
identify the infected person. The manual contact tracing is
not only slow, have a late response, but would also require
resources for identifying infected persons and then asking for
his contact and then contacts of his contacts to track the flow
of the disease. The technologies soon realized the importance
of smartphones and used the inbuilt smartphone sensors for
tracking in an automated and efficient way. The use of digital
technologies help the citizen at the early stage of the virus
spread and inform people for the isolation at the early stage.
The use of smartphone apps for contact tracing has shown
promising results in several countries to combat the spread
of the virus, however, the performance efficiency depends on
the number of people using the application. One thing limit
the usage of the app is the privacy, because a large number
of existing apps store data at the central trusted system, and
in some circumstance, this data is made available to the third
party systems for performing artificial Intelligence and data
analysis.
C. Vendor Support
As the healthcare officers and medical entities are working
together worldwide to fight the spread of this pandemic,
Google and Apple have joined an effort and developed a
privacy-preserving contact tracing API. This framework allows
healthcare agencies to limit the spread of the disease with
the help of Bluetooth technology. The draft documentation
for Exposure Notification API is available online [47]. This
API will bring interoperability between iOS and Android
devices while maintaining privacy, consent, and transparency
[48]. A test project, PACT (Private Automated Contact Trac-
ing), was built at MIT to harness the strength of Bluetooth-
based, privacy-preserving, automated contact tracing API. This
project detects proximity between contacts with the help of
Bluetooth signals within a 6-foot radius. Instead of relying on
the GPS, this system sends out random Bluetooth numbers,
which can later be updated to a database with the user’s
consent [49]. The first large scale-pilot for this joint venture
has been launched in Switzerland, known as SwissCovid. This
application determines the close contact that lasted for more
than 15 minutes and notifies the user with the procedure to
follow [50].
Apple also released a new application for COVID-19 based
on CDC guidelines that provide COVID-19 information across
the USA. In this application, the users have to answer some
questions related to recent exposure and risk factors. In
return, they get a CDC recommendation on what their next
step is to be. However, this application does not replace a
healthcare worker in any way [51], [52]. Another application,
“HEALTHLYNKED COVID-19 Tracker”, which became the
most downloaded coronavirus tracker application for March.
The application enables users to track local cases and chat
with other users around the world. The most unique feature
of this application is that it enables real-time chat with other
users and share updates [53], [54].
IV. ANALYSIS OF CONTACT TRACING APPS
In this section, we will present our approach to studying cur-
rent contact tracing apps for COVID-19. We have focused on
smartphone apps for any platform (iOS, Android, Microsoft)
and available anywhere in the world. Although there appears
a concerted effort by governments across the globe to contain
the pandemic, we identified through our analysis that many
such apps have been developed by third-party individuals
or organizations. Therefore, we have included these in our
analysis. Furthermore, as the contact tracing technology is still
in its early stages (especially within the context of COVID-19),
although many apps claim to perform track and trace function,
their effectiveness in this respect is subjective.
A. Data collection
As our aim for this study was to achieve an in-depth analysis
of the state-of-the-art, we used exhaustive search techniques to
identify available applications across all platforms, irrespective
5of the country in focus or the developing organization (gov-
ernment and private). Further, due to the difficulties faced by
several countries to achieve effective contact tracing, we did
not exclude apps performing the partial or limited function
in this regard. Overall, we identified 26 smartphone apps that
claim to perform contact tracing in their description (in google
play or app store) belonging to 17 different countries. Details
of these apps are presented in table V with a brief description
of some apps presented below.
• COVID-19 Gov PK is an app developed by the gov-
ernment of Pakistan. Initially, the application provided
awareness to citizens about COVID-19, however, with
the development of the new radius alert feature, this
application requires access to the user’s location at the
time of installation [55].
• Health Canada is developed by the government of
Canada to provide a personalized recommendation to the
users based on their risk factors. Personal data collected
is only used by Health Canada and is not shared with any
other application or agency [56].
• The government of Vietnam has developed an application
named COVID-19 which includes features such as chat-
bot, consultation, and live updates on COVID-19. The
application requires access to media, location, storage,
device ID, and call logs. The application’s privacy poli-
cies are updated in its native language [57].
• COVID19 - DXB Smart App is developed by the gov-
ernment of Dubai and provides general information on
COVID-19 and also provides correct statistics. The appli-
cation collects personal information voluntarily but does
not share with the third-party applications unless required
by the law [58].
• COVI is a third-party COVID-19 informative app de-
veloped by Droobi, a Qatar based digital company that
deals with the development of science-based programs.
The application has introductory materials on COVID-19,
accurate updates from the Ministry of Health, Qatar and
WHO, and useful tips to prevent the spread of the Corona
virus. This application collects personal data such as
contact information, age, health information, and unique
identifiers, etc [59].
• Corona360 is an app developed in South Korea which
enables users to update their COVID-19 status as well as
view the status of other people. For privacy reasons, the
app does not collect any personal information such as ID,
name, or phone number [60].
• CoronaCheck is a third-party application has been de-
veloped to enable its users to conduct self-assessment
and provide accurate expert COVID-19 information to
the users. This application does not collect any personal
information and does not share data with third-party
vendors [61].
Our study of these apps consisted of analyzing publicly
available information shared by the app developers and plat-
form i.e. privacy policy, permissions requested, and user
reviews. Furthermore, as some of the apps did not use SSL, we
performed black-box testing of the apps using the Burp suite
to analyze the network traffic during the app usage. The traffic
analysis did indeed help us identify the information collected
by these apps and shared with back-end servers which are
liable to interception using network sniffing software.
B. Permission analysis
Permissions required by a smartphone app are significant as
they communicate with the user the resources required by the
app to perform its function. Therefore, presenting the user with
a list of permissions not only achieves transparency (providing
the user an insight into the app operation) but it also serves to
seek user consent. Within the context of our study, we have
gathered information about the permissions required by the
track and trace apps under study. Figure 3 presents a graphical
representation of the distribution of the apps with respect to
permissions required by them.
As presented in Figure 3, we expected the majority of the
apps to require access to location data of a device however our
study also identified permissions requested by the apps which
are not necessary to perform their function. For instance,
we identified 06 apps that require access to SMS and call
information of the device. In some scenarios access to phone
numbers can be envisioned however access to SMS within a
device is not essential to the function of a track and trace
app. Similarly, we identified 04 apps to require access to the
camera of the device which is of course an unexpected request
by a track and trace app.
Furthermore, four of the apps studied require access to the
microphone of the device whereas 05 apps requiring access
to media and storage of the device which are of course not
critical to the app’s function. Such apps are indeed causing for
concern concerning the privacy of their users and exemplify
a lack of attention to the security and privacy of users by the
app developers.
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Fig. 3: Distribution of apps and permissions requested
C. Analysing privacy
To understand the privacy considerations applied for the
apps within our study, our analysis took into account the
privacy policy published by the application developer as well
as the use of basic privacy protection mechanisms such as
SSL/TLS to achieve encrypted data transmissions.
6Through the study of privacy policies of the apps, we
concluded that most of the apps collect personal data such
as location information, name, and phone number, etc. This
is expected as such information is vital for an effective track
and trace function however appropriate mechanisms should
be applied to ensure secure sharing, processing, and storage of
such data. Such details were not available for most of the apps
analyzed in this study. Furthermore, an interesting observation
we made was the type of information gathered by the apps.
Specifically, our analysis identified that the track and trace app
developed by Dubai collects specific personal information such
as date of birth, name, email address, and caller ID. This level
of information is not required for effective track and trace but
it would in effect risk the privacy of users under real threat
as any malicious actor with access to such information can
easily perform attacks such as ID theft. We believe the data
collection policies for such apps require immediate attention
to minimize risk to individual user privacy.
Another aspect concerning privacy of information collected
is how the stored and shared by the apps. In this respect, our
analysis revealed that 10 of the apps studied share data with
third parties however the nature and identity of such parties
is not identified in the privacy policies. This is a cause of
concern concerning individual privacy as the aims of sharing
this data are not clear and therefore users are not aware of how
their data may be used. For instance, a common apprehension
among users is the sharing of data with advertisement agencies
who may wish to use such data for targeted advertisement and
adware.
Having said this, we also identified examples of good
practice within our analysis. Specifically, some of the apps
clearly state requirements for user consent before sharing
data with third parties thereby assuring users with respect
to how their data is shared. For instance, Corona360 (the
app developed by the government of South Korea) collects
personal and sensitive data of users but whenever the data is
used, the user is notified for the reason of data usage.
In addition to the above, our analysis also uncovered
security vulnerabilities within some apps. In particular, we
identified 05 apps that were not using SSL/TLS to ensure
secure communication made through the app. Pursuing this
direction of analysis, we conducted traffic monitoring of such
apps and identified serious flaws in the app developed by
the government of Pakistan. Details of these vulnerabilities
have been reported to the relevant authorities however such
vulnerabilities do put user privacy at risk especially where the
app is collecting and utilizing personal user data.
D. App review analysis
In addition to the permissions requested, privacy policy,
and traffic analysis of the worldwide COVID-19 track and
trace apps, we have also studied user comments available in
Google Play and App Store reviewing these apps. Although
the majority of these comments are related to the usability
and general function of the app, we found some comments to
be insightful with respect to how the app collects and utilizes
data. For instance, the app developed by the government of
Israel was commented by a user to ask for users’ permission
when sharing data with third parties as well as to guarantee
not to send the data anywhere but compare it locally on
user’s device against downloaded ”Corona paths”. Another
interesting observation was made for the app developed by
the government of Germany where user comments suggest
that one cannot use the app without connecting to a fitness
account and hence completely breaking the point of anonymity.
As suggested by the user, connecting to the app via a fitness
app such as Fitbit indeed does indicate sharing personal user
data across different apps which is a risk to user privacy.
Through analysis of the user reviews of apps, we observed
that although some of the users have included concerns about
privacy of information through their feedback, these are rela-
tive minor proportion of users. For instance, for the COVID-
19 Gov PK app, user review include comments highlighting
lack of encryption and concerns about data travelling in plain-
text. However, for apps such as Corona-Datenspende which
requires a user to connect to a fitness app as a pre-requisite,
there are no user comments with regards to how data is
captured, analyzed, stored and processed between the third-
party fitness app and the government app for CVOID-19.
These observations reflect lack of awareness among users
with regards to measures to preserve privacy of personal data
collected, stored and analyzed by computing systems therefore
requiring efforts to raise awareness among users.
V. CONCLUSIONS
As Coronavirus is a contagious disease that spreads through
human contact, contract tracing is vital to containing its
spread. Furthermore, mobile devices present an ideal platform
to introduce contract tracing software due to their ease of
use, widespread ownership and personalized usage. Therefore,
several smartphone apps have been developed by governments,
international agencies, and other parties. However, there is
an increasing concern regarding the collection of data, out-
sourcing data to the third-party system. In this paper, we
analyzed a large set of contact-tracing apps for different
security and privacy metrics. Specifically, we analyzed contact-
tracing apps for permission analysis, privacy analysis, the
security of the apps, and reviews of the users. Across the
analyzed applications, we found that the proposed apps were
more likely to require unnecessary permissions, outsource the
data to the third-party system. We have also identified that
some apps (used in developing countries) are not adopting
proper security measures for the exchange of the data to and
from the user to the data centers. Our analysis of the user
reviews and the ratings for contact-tracing apps suggested that
a large number of users are aware of privacy concerns these
apps might to them. As a part of our future work, we are
looking to develop a survey questioner that directly considers
the feedback from users to further understand the usability and
security concerns of users.
7TABLE I: Analysis of Worldwide Track and Trace Apps
App Platform Permissions Requested Privacy Policy Country No of
Down-
loads
TLS/
SSL
App Reviews
COVID-19
Gov PK
Android Location (approximate and pre-
cise), receives data from internet,
full network access, prevent device
from sleeping
Data to be shared with third party Pakistan 500,000+ No No proper setup of any encryption.
Data might be travelling in plain-
text. Moreover, radius alert is not
accurate. Doesnt show the actual
patients infected with COVID-19
COVID
Symptom
Tracker
Android/
Apple
Wifi connection information, full
network access, change audio set-
tings, run at startup, prevent device
from sleeping
Collects sensitive personal infor-
mation such as DOB, name, gen-
der, COVID-19 tests status, lo-
cation, Details of any treatment,
email, phone number, IP address.
Shared with universities, research
centers, collect personal data and
share with third party such as ama-
zon web service, google analytic,
and sentry etc.
United
King-
dom
500,000+ N/A App gives basic information related
to COVID-19 symptoms, helps
people take pre-cautionary mea-
sures to self-isolate themselves
BC
COVID-19
Support
Android/
Apple
Location (approximate and pre-
cise), receives data from internet,
full network access, prevent device
from sleeping
Personal information is collected
for the purposes of providing
COVID-19 related information and
screening, and for the manage-
ment of COVID-19, Only used for
purposes related to supporting the
Ministry of Health in managing
COVID-19, and not disclosed or
retained for any other purposes.
Canada 10,000+ Yes App doesnt get updates on a reg-
ular basis with current stats. Also,
there is no graph of active cases.
Gives inaccurate and outdated in-
formation
OpenWHO:
Knowledge
for Health
Emergen-
cies
Android/AppleWifi connection information, full
network access, access of me-
dia/files and storage, run at startup,
prevent the device from sleeping
Requires name and email to create
an account which will be used for
communications and the announce-
ment of changes to the openWHO
platform
United
States
500,000+ No Language issue to some people.
Gives out a certificate for com-
pleting the course, increases public
health knowledge
COVID19
Care for
Media
Android/
Apple
SMS, full network access, device
from sleeping
May collect sensitive data such
as NIC, name, city, province and
share this with third party for ac-
cess
Pakistan 10,000+ Yes Gives detailed information related
to COVID-19 protection, symp-
toms
Health
Assessment
PDMA
Android/
Apple
Location (approximate and pre-
cise), receives data from internet
and full network access
Information will be accessed by
Smart Asset Sindh Health, also
with third party
Pakistan 10,000+ No Data information is being sent in
plain-text. No encryption or algo-
rithm is used for data protection.
Too many bugs. The form requires
information but doesnt work when
clicking to ”Proceed”
Pakistan’s
National
Action
Plan for
COVID-19
Android This application requires no special
permissions to run
No information being shared Pakistan 50,000+ Yes Shares information related to
COVID-19 and SOPs that
government has launched for
the safety of people
Health
Monitoring
PDMA
Android Location (approximate and pre-
cise), receives data from internet
and full network access
Information will be accessed by
Smart Asset Sindh Health, also
with third party
Pakistan 1000+ No Data information is being sent in
plain text. No encryption or algo-
rithm is used for data protection.
Too many bugs. Doesnt work effi-
ciently. Too many bad reviews.
Canada
COVID-19
Android Location (approximate and pre-
cise), receives data from internet,
full network access, prevent device
from sleeping
Personal data is collected by Health
Canada and will not disclose or
retain user’s personal information
for any other purposes.
Canada 50,000+ Yes App doesnt ask for pre-existing
conditions and immediately as-
sume with COVID-19 symptoms
if there’s cough or difficulty in
breathing. Patients may have aes-
thema issues too? Will be much
more effective if user can see map
with active cases.
8COVID-19 Android Location, phone, media, storage,
camera, microphone, wifi, device
ID, call information, download
files without notification, run at
start up, prevent device from sleep-
ing
May use personal information with
third party
Vietnam 100,000+ N/A App is only available for Veit-
namese and not available in En-
glish. The developer has misguided
English language is not available
and very narrow coverage overall.
Provides basic information. Only
accessible in Veitnam
COVI Android Location, phone, wifi, device ID,
call information, pair with Blue-
tooth devices, receive data from
interent, run at start up, prevent
device from sleeping
Information such as DOB, name,
account number is collected and
shared with trusted third parties
Qatar 10,000+ N/A Only restricted for the people liv-
ing in Qatar. Instantly asks for the
mobile number with Qatar code, so
couldnt access Doesnt get updates.
Provides basic information. Only
accessible in Qatar.
COVID19 -
DXB Smart
App
Android Microphone, camera, location,
storage, calender, wifi connection,
media, receive data from Internet,
pair with Bluetooth devices, full
network access, prevent device
from sleeping, change audio
settings
Sends personal information such as
ID, name, DOB, email, geographi-
cal location to third party
Dubai 1000+ N/A Only restricted for the people liv-
ing in Dubai. Instantly asks for the
mobile number with Dubai code.
Some users reported experiencing
network error whenever they open
this app.
Corona 360 Android Location (approximate and pre-
cise), receives data from internet,
full network access, prevent device
from sleeping
Collects personal and sensitive data
of user but whenever the data is
being used, the user is notified for
the reason
South
Korea
10+ Yes Useful and multilingual solution
for find Corona free locations
CoronaCheck Android/
Apple
Full network access Will not share any information Pakistan 10,000+ Yes Gives detailed information related
to COVID-19 protection, symp-
toms. Translate English to Vocal
language.
Coronavirus
Australia
Android/
Apple
Location (approximate and pre-
cise), receives data from internet
and full network access
Collects information but does not
use it without asking from the user
Australia 500,000+ N/A App opens in web browser which
is clunky, the infection status is
updated less often than the press
releases, and is out of date later in
the day.
NHS App Android/
Apple
Location, phone, media, storage,
camera, microphone, wifi, device
ID, call information, download
files without notification, run at
start up, prevent device from sleep-
ing
No specific information about shar-
ing data with third parties
United
King-
dom
500,000+ N/A Asks for passport photo to scan
your face, it says enter name, DOB,
NHS number and then your post-
code. After all this it says we’ll
take 12 hours to process your de-
tails. What if someone wants to use
this app now and have to wait 12
hours at least to use it. Also, it
says it only works with Android 8
or above. However, it worked on
android 5.1
Aarogya
Setu
Android Location (approximate and pre-
cise), receives data from internet
and full network access
Cannot access its privacy policy India 50,000,000+ N/A Instantly asks for mobile num-
ber to register with Indian code.
Also it asked for location, net-
work and Bluetooth visibility No
proper tracking, no radius alert,
bugs, doesnt update cases. Takes
a new location every time when
accessed
HEALTH
LYNKED
COVID-19
Tracker
Apple N/A High privacy, data sharing with ap-
ple
United
States
N/A N/A N/A
TraceTogether Android/
Apple
Media, storage, receive data from
Internet, pair wth bluetooth de-
vices, full internet access, prevent
device from sleeping
Mobile number and anonymous ID
are shared in secure server and not
available to be shared with Public
Singapore 500,000+ N/A Doesn’t alert you to infected cases
in your area. Drains battery pretty
fast due to Bluetooth connection.
9HaMagen Android/
Apple
Device and app history, location,
wifi connection, full network ac-
cess, prevent device from sleeping,
change network connectivity
Cross-referencing location data
with the corona patients, will be
directed to a link to the Ministry
of Health to inform about steps to
take and report the match to The
Ministry. However, the app can be
closed anytime
Israel 1,000,000+ No Correlates overlaps only since in-
stallation. Should get last 3 weeks
from device’s history, or Google’s
timeline, or any other such source.
Ask users permission. Guarantee
not to send the data anywhere but
compare it locally on user’s de-
cide against downloaded ”Corona
paths”. Keeps showing the same
potential exposure over and over
and over
Corona-
Datenspende
Android/
Apple
Wifi connection and full network
access
Collects personal data such as
name, DOB, gender, location, IP
address however implements secu-
rity to protect this data
Germany 100,000+ N/A The implementation is idiotic; one
cannot use the app without con-
necting to a fitness account and
hence completely breaking the
point of anonymity. Doesn’t work
with my Polar M430. Login to
Fitbit not possible using latest
Android on OnePlus7Pro - nei-
ther email/password (not possi-
ble to input credentials) not lo-
gin with Google/Facebook (not yet
supported).
Home
Quarantine
(Kwaran-
tanna
domowa)
Android/
Apple
Location, phone, media, storage,
camera, microphone, wifi, device
ID, call information, download
files without notification, run at
start up, prevent device from sleep-
ing
Collected data may be shared with
third party
Poland
100,000+
N/A N/A GPS location is invalid. Cannot add
phone number as it gives away
error.
WHO Info Android/
Apple
Full network access, media, storage Collect personal data of user for
record but do not share with third
parties
Switzerland 100,000+ Yes Very little data or charts. Not con-
sistent with Worldometer. Mostly
an aggregation of news feeds about
WHO
NHS 24 :
COVID-19
Android/
Apple
Full network access, receives data
from internet prevent device from
sleeping
Collect personal data and share
with third party
UK 1000+ N/A Not Compatible Basic information
only
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